FCC Widens Tech Crackdown to Humanoid Robots and Power Inverters

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has significantly expanded its Covered List to include foreign-produced advanced robotic devices (including mobile robots such as humanoid and quadruped robots) and connected power inverters, effectively barring most new products in those categories from receiving equipment authorization for importation, marketing, or sale in the United States. On July 28, 2026, the FCC announced the expansion, following formal national security determinations by a White House-convened Executive Branch interagency body which concluded that these categories of products “pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the safety and security of United States persons.”

The action marks another step in the federal government’s broader effort to secure critical technology supply chains supporting artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing, critical infrastructure, and the electric grid. It also signals that connected operational technologies, including autonomous robotic systems, are increasingly being regulated through the lens of national security rather than traditional product safety or communications regulation.

Importantly, the FCC emphasized that the action is prospective, meaning that it will not affect existing products. The immediate commercial impact is expected to fall primarily on future product introductions rather than equipment currently deployed in the marketplace. Manufacturers may seek approval for new products by demonstrating that a particular device or class of devices does not present the identified national security risks. Although details regarding the technical review process remain limited, manufacturers and companies developing or deploying robotics should anticipate significant regulatory scrutiny of their supply chains, robotic platform infrastructure, cybersecurity controls, and data handling practices.

The FCC’s inclusion of connected power inverters on the Covered List reflects similar concerns regarding the security risks posed by connected technologies in the energy sector. As inverter-based resources become more widely deployed across critical energy infrastructure, including in AI data centers, renewable energy projects, battery energy storage systems, and microgrids, federal regulators appear increasingly focused on reducing dependence on foreign-manufactured operational technology. The Executive Branch’s national security determination emphasized concerns regarding the growing role of inverter-based resources across the U.S. electric grid. The determination notes that internet-connected inverters may introduce vulnerabilities that could allow malicious actors to remotely disable or manipulate inverter operations, collect sensitive operational data, or facilitate unauthorized remote access and surveillance. Companies planning new energy infrastructure projects should evaluate procurement strategies, supplier relationships, and equipment specifications in light of these evolving restrictions.

The FCC’s recent action should also be viewed as part of a much broader federal effort to limit the introduction of certain Chinese-developed technologies into the U.S. market, particularly where those technologies may become integrated into critical infrastructure or generate access to sensitive operational or personal data. Over the past several years, Congress and federal agencies have increasingly relied on national security authorities, as opposed to traditional trade or product safety laws, to restrict market access for technologies perceived to create unacceptable supply chain or cybersecurity risks. Rather than focusing solely on communications equipment, regulators have steadily expanded their attention to connected devices, artificial intelligence programs, cloud infrastructure, and other emerging technologies that could provide foreign adversaries with strategic leverage over critical U.S. industries.

This development reflects an increasingly comprehensive “trusted technology” framework emerging across the federal government. In January of this year, the Bureau of Industry and Security issued a final rule addressing information and communications technology and services (ICTS) which prohibited the import of vehicle connectivity systems, automated driving systems, and other connected vehicles from Russia and China. Another significant component of this broader national security strategy is the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Outbound Investment Security Program, which took effect in January of 2025. Rather than restricting the import of foreign technology, the program regulates certain outbound investments by U.S. persons into entities located in or controlled by persons from countries of concern that develop advanced technologies, including semiconductors and microelectronics, quantum information technologies, and certain artificial intelligence systems. The program reflects the federal government’s recognition that capital investment often transfers more than just financing, but can also provide strategic expertise, technical knowledge, market access, and other intangible benefits that accelerate the development of technologies with potential military, intelligence, surveillance, or cybersecurity applications.

Viewed alongside the FCC’s expanding of the Covered List these federal actions demonstrate that U.S. policymakers are increasingly regulating the entire lifecycle of critical technologies, from investment and research phases through manufacturing and market deployment. This regulation functions as part of a coordinated effort to limit the advancement of technologies that could enhance the strategic capabilities of foreign adversaries.

Together with the FCC’s Covered List, outbound investment restrictions, enhanced export controls on advanced semiconductors and AI technologies, federal procurement restrictions, and expanding supply chain security requirements, these prohibitions form a part of a coordinated regulatory approach to reduce reliance on technologies associated with foreign adversaries. It is likely that restrictions on technological imports from these countries and others will continue to increase as national security considerations related to new developing technologies broaden.

For companies operating in emerging technology sectors, these developments underscore the importance of incorporating geopolitical and national security considerations into business planning at an early stage. Product design, supplier selection, investment decisions, and merger and acquisition activity increasingly require diligence beyond traditional commercial considerations. Companies developing robotics, AI programs, industrial automation technologies, or energy infrastructure should expect regulators and customers alike to scrutinize the provenance of hardware, software, firmware, cloud services, and component suppliers. As federal agencies continue to expand the scope of technologies considered critical to national security, proactive supply chain risk management and technology governance will likely become important competitive differentiators rather than merely regulatory compliance obligations.

Babst Calland attorneys are tracking the most pressing issues related to robotics, data center development, and energy projects. For questions or more information, please contact Justine Kasznica at (412) 394-6466 or jkasznica@babstcalland.com, Susanna Bagdasarova at (412) 394-5435 or sbagdasarova@babstcalland.com,  or Morgan Hubbard at (412) 773-8717 or mhubbard@babstcalland.com.